THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON IN HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT: THINKING ABOUT §§ 34-41 OF HIS ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT - DOI: 10.12818/P.0304-2340.2015v66p177

Resumo

ABSTRACT

 The concept of the person appears at the beginning of the first book of Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right (EPR). By this position, it seems to be designed as the conceptual link between the theory of free will exposed in the introduction of the work and the subsequent institutional or juridical concepts, the concept of property and the concept of contract. The aim of this paper is to find out if personhood as addressed by Hegel can afford such a linkage. In order to answer this question, the paper seeks to carve out what it is to be a person in Hegel’s sense via an analysis of EPR §§ 34-41. The analysis arrives at the conclusion that the specific feature which discerns persons from self-conscious subjects in general indicates personhood as an institutional concept right from the start. Being an institutional concept itself, personhood can not function as a legitimating reason for the contents and structures of abstract right.

 KEYWORDS: Person. Hegel. Philosophy of right.